



Evaluating Counterinsurgency Gains Across International and Afghan Programs

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Outline

- **Why metrics?**
 - (1) Understanding local dynamics
 - (2) Assessing VSO successes and challenges
 - (3) Improving future efforts
- **Overview of data collection**
 - (1) Polling data
 - (2) Team data
- **Types of Assessments**
 - (1) Quarterly review
 - (2) Incremental assessments
- **Importance to Policymakers**

Why Metrics?

Addressing Key Operational Questions

Key Operational Questions 1: Understanding Local Conditions



Premise:

Understanding local conditions and perceptions key to operational success.



Three Questions:

- (1) What are local conditions?
- (2) What are the biggest problems that individuals face?
- (3) How are these conditions changing over time?

Example 1: Local Socioeconomic Conditions



Example 2: Local Governance



Key Operational Questions 2: Assessing Operational Impact

Premise:

Evaluating operational success important for improving and expanding VSO.


Three Questions:

- (1) How have VSO teams affected support for ISAF and GIRoA?
- (2) Why have some VSO teams been more successful in winning hearts and minds?
- (3) How have local sociocultural factors (e.g. unemployment, tribes, etc.) affected the success of the VSO teams?

Example: Impact of VSOs on Insurgent Activity

Studied impact of VSOs on district-wide SIGACTS

- Enemy attacks increase in first 9 months, decrease afterwards
- Enemy attacks estimated to fall below baseline after 18 months



Key Operational Questions 3: Improving VSO Effectiveness

Premise:

Assessing value of different operational tools (e.g. ALP, CERP, etc.) helps improve future efforts.

Two Questions:

- (1) What is the relative effectiveness of different VSO operational tools?**
- (2) How does the local context affect the success of these tools?**

Example: Assessing potential impact of economic tools on support for allied (and enemy) forces

Support Factor category	Findings	Implication
Services & Local Infra-structure	<p><u>Roads and Education:</u> Positive relationship with Afghan and ISAF, negative with Taliban and Jihadis</p> <p><u>Water:</u> Positive relationship with Afghan security forces only; negative with Taliban</p> <p><u>Medical Care:</u> Positive relationship with ALP only</p> <p><u>Jobs/Employment:</u> No significant relationship with support for friendly forces</p>	<p>(1) Cash-for-work programs unlikely to bring meaningful effects</p> <p>(2) Road and education programs expected to have highest impact</p>
Socio-economic	<p><u>Income:</u> Income has no effect on support</p> <p><u>Wealth:</u> Large landowners support ISAF only</p> <p><u>Quality of Infrastructure:</u> Quality of infrastructure has positive effect on ISAF/Afghan support; weak effect on support for Jihadis/Taliban</p> <p><u>Education:</u> Positive association with Afghan security forces only</p> <p><u>Ethnic Identity:</u> Pashtuns do not differ from other ethnicities in support for ISAF and Afghan security forces; more likely to reject Jihadis</p>	<p>(1) Cash-for-work programs unlikely to bring meaningful effects</p> <p>(2) Benefits of ISAF efforts may accrue disproportionately to wealthy landowners</p> <p>(3) Infrastructure projects expected to have highest impact</p> <p>(4) Pashtun presence not necessarily problematic</p>
Tribal/ Ethnic Composition	<p><u>Tribal/Ethnic Composition:</u> No measurable effect</p>	<p>(1) Tribal and ethnic structure unlikely to affect efforts</p>

Data Collection:
Polling and Team Data

Quarterly Polling Data

- **Overview of Polling Data**

- Interviews private citizens across VSO sites
- 10,000 individuals surveyed (~30% women)


- **Collected Quarterly:**

- Wave 1: October – November 2010
- Wave 2: February – March 2011
- Wave 3: May – June 2011 (ongoing)
- Wave 4: August – September 2011 (planned)

- **Types of Data**

- Demographic: income, tribal affiliation, education, employment
- Beliefs and Opinions: security, development, governance

Quarterly Polling Data



VSO Team Data

- **Overview of Team Data**

- Team commanders fill out short questionnaire
- Includes all active VSO sites
- Includes narrative assessments

- **Collected Bi-Weekly:**

- Collection started in mid-November
- 10 waves of data currently available


- **Data Collected for 4 Lines of Operation (LOOs)**

- Security: fire incidents, intimidation, IEDs cleared,
- Governance: corruption, shuras and jirgas held
- Capacity Building: ALP reporting for duty, ALP patrols, ALP dependence on ISAF
- Socioeconomic Development: access to roads, water, healthcare, market access

VSO Team Data: Focus on 4 LOOs


(1) Security

(U) FIRE INCIDENTS & ALP REPORTING FOR DUTY




(2) Governance

(U) ANA/ANP & ALP INAPPROPRIATE ACTIVITY




(3) Capacity Building

(U) ALP Measures



(4) Socioeconomic Development

(U) ACCESS TO ROADS & HEALTHCARE 1: No Access, 4: Complete Access



Types of Assessments

Quarterly Review

- **Produced quarterly to coincide with polling data**
 - Two quarterly reviews (December and March) completed
 - Third review due June 24
- **Uses both recent and older data**
 - Second Review:
 - 2 waves of polling data; 8 waves of team data
 - Third review:
 - 3 waves of polling data; 14 waves of team data
 - Will augment with non-CFSOCC data (e.g. SIGACTS)
- **Key Goals:**
 - Update information on local conditions
 - Analyze VSO sites along four LOOs
 - Provide site-by-site analysis of team data
 - Assess successes and challenges facing teams

Incremental Assessment 1: Factors Affecting Support for Actors

- **Key Question:**


- How can we increase local support for the coalition and the Afghan government while at the same time diminish support for the Taliban?

- **Idea:**


- Polling data provides data on support for actors – i.e. ISAF, GIRoA, Taliban, Jihadists
- Study relationship of infrastructure, socioeconomic characteristics, and social structure with support
- Examine relationship of team variables (e.g. ALP) with support


Incremental Assessment 2: Impact of CERP on Insurgent Activity

- **Key Question:**
 - What effect does CMO have on stability?
- **Idea:**
 - Study how SIGACTS change post-CERP




Example: CERP Project in Pay Tutu






JWAC Approach



Comparing JWAC and Our Approach



Importance to Policymakers

Premise:

DOD has tentatively authorized 30,000 ALP, will support CFSOCC-A by attaching conventional units.

Key Questions:

- (1) Is the VSO program successful?
- (2) What are the key challenges that an expanded VSO program is likely to face?

